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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly accepted that innovation companies are subject to financial constraints associ-
ated with the presence of information asymmetry and moral hazard problems, which provoke 
a higher cost of financing research and development (R&D) activities with respect to ordinary 
investment and a lower level of funding by private external financers, who are reluctant to 
lend when the investment is concentrated essentially on intangible assets (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994; Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010). Also because knowledge is characterized 
by increasing returns to scale and because of the uncertainty and the incomplete appropriabil-
ity of R&D returns due to knowledge spillovers, private investment in R&D is expected to be 
below the optimum social level (Arrow, 1962).  
In this context, it is not surprising that the main justification for public intervention is 
the correction of these market failures (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013), although public 
agencies may also have other goals when supporting business R&D. Among these objectives, 
we can emphasize the promotion of national champions, the technological upgrading of firms 
that are of particular importance in declining or traditional industries, or the funding of R&D 
projects that would not be otherwise carried out (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Clausen, 2007). 
Obviously, public intervention can result in a negative effect on aggregate business 
R&D if awarded firms reduce their own R&D investment, displacing or crowding out private 
investment. With this in mind, many empirical articles which try to measure the impact of 
public aid on private R&D have been published, with several countries studied and many 
methodologies applied (see Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014, and Becker, 2014, for a review). 
And, from a policy point of view, many of these papers conclude that R&D subsidies generate 
larger additionality at the extensive margin (share of R&D performers) than at the intensive 
margin (R&D intensity of actual performers).  
This article tries to go more deeply into the knowledge of the actual relationship be-
tween public and private R&D expenditures. More in detail, our aim is to analyze the effect of 
being awarded aid by the Center for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI) on the 
firm’s decision to self-finance R&D. The CDTI is the main public agency providing funding 
for firms’ R&D projects in Spain. Among the typology of funding programs managed by the 
CDTI between 2003 and 2005, we focus on the following: Technological Development Pro-
jects, Technological Innovation Projects and Joint Industrial Research Projects. By means of 
these, the CDTI funded firms to conduct R&D projects with low-interest loans (that is, with 
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an interest rate lower than normal rates for the current market) that could reach 60% of the 
total budget.  
Although there are many references which deal with the impact of subsidies on R&D 
projects, few of them focus on programs based on low-interest loans. Despite the fact that 
low-interest credits include a hidden subsidy (equivalent to the saving in financial costs), their 
effects on the firm’s decisions are not expected to be the same for at least three reasons: i) 
low-interest loans are fully compatible with tax benefits; ii) the percentage of the financed 
budget is usually higher, simultaneously increasing the firm’s chances to get private financ-
ing; iii) as the firm must pay back the loan, it imposes self-discipline on it, something not pre-
sent with other types of aid. In that sense, low-interest loans should be expected to generate 
higher additionality than the equivalent subsidy or limit the crowding out effect. 
Notice that the factors that determine participation in the public system of low-interest 
loans may be the same as those which affect the firm’s R&D decision. This fact could have 
biased the estimates of the impact upward if the CDTI had selected firms with a higher likeli-
hood of self-financing R&D projects. Among the existing methodologies which deal with this 
bias, in this paper a two-stage procedure is presented. Firstly, we estimate the determinants of 
participation in CDTI programs (selection equation), trying to assess the characteristics of 
projects awarded the aid. Then, in a second stage, we estimate the factors affecting the firm’s 
decision to allocate its own resources to R&D activities (impact equation). When dealing with 
this second equation, the predicted value for the probability of participation obtained from the 
first one is used as an explanatory variable.  
Additionally, the R&D expenditure decision may well show some persistence that 
should be considered. The presence of sunk costs or learning-by-doing associated with these 
activities could make, among other reasons, that firms with R&D expenditures one year were 
more likely to continue investing the next period.  
The main contribution of this study to the literature on impact assessment of public 
support for R&D is that our analysis takes into consideration both the selection problem and  
potential persistence in the decision to undertake R&D activities. Only a few papers have ana-
lyzed the effect of public aid in the presence of persistence in the R&D decision1, but to our 
knowledge none of them focus on the impact of low-interest loans. We use the method pro-
posed by Wooldridge (2005) to control for this possibility of persistence. Our results confirm 
                                                
1 See, for example, the papers by Arqué-Castells and Mohnen (2012) and Arqué-Castells (2013). 
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the existence of a positive impact of CDTI low-interest loans on self-financed R&D, even 
once persistence effects are considered, showing the effectiveness of CDTI programs. 
The rest of the paper is divided into four parts. After this introduction, in Section 2 we re-
view empirical evidence. In section 3, we describe the empirical methodology along with the 
main variables included in the database, trying to obtain a guide of supported firm-related 
variables that will be used later on as explanatory factors in the econometric analysis. Section 
4 shows the estimates of both the selection and the impact equations, stressing the differences 
in these decisions between small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) and large firms and be-
tween manufacturing and services firms. Finally, we present key conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND THE DECISION TO INVEST IN R&D 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the main channel through which public funding can impact  
business R&D investment is the reduction of the cost of R&D (Bloom, Griffith and Van 
Reenen, 2002). This is especially obvious in the case of firms deciding to start R&D projects 
in the presence of financial constraints.2 Given the higher level of uncertainty surrounding 
innovative projects and the public good character of knowledge, innovative firms usually face 
a higher cost of external financing, and can even be credit rationed. Therefore, they mainly 
rely on their own resources to finance R&D projects. In this context, the decision to engage in  
R&D is quite sensitive to the availability of internal liquidity, and access to external sources 
of financing could induce firms to undertake R&D projects that would not otherwise be start-
ed (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). 
Consistent with this interpretation, González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005) model the 
relationship between R&D subsidy effectiveness and the existence of barriers to R&D in 
terms of set-up costs. In their model, the decision of whether or not to spend on R&D arises 
from the comparison of optimal non-zero effort with the effort needed to reach some profita-
bility (threshold effort). Below this threshold, R&D costs cannot be completely recovered and 
firms will decide not to undertake innovative activities, but this decision can be modified if 
expected subsidies reduce the cost of R&D. 
                                                
2 As Mancusi and Vezzulli (2014) point out for a large representative sample of manufacturing SMEs, credit 
rationing has a negative impact on both the probability of setting up R&D activities and the level of R&D ex-
penditure (conditioned on the R&D decision), and the global estimated reduction in R&D expenditure is mostly 
associated with the first impact. 
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Also considering the existence of fixed R&D costs and a cost of external finance, Ta-
kalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2013a) develop a structural model of strategic interaction 
among subsidy applicants and public and private sector R&D financiers to analyze the effects 
of R&D subsidies. From this model, they conclude that higher costs of external finance pro-
vide a reason to increase R&D subsidies at the extensive margin, where firms decide whether 
or not to invest in R&D. 
From an empirical point of view, the evidence about the impact of public aid on pri-
vate R&D is mostly related to subsidy programs for R&D projects. Some interesting exam-
ples are the papers by Walsten (2000) analyzing US firms, Lach (2002) for Israeli companies, 
Busom (2000) and Gonzalez, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005) for Spain, Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) and Czarnitzki and Licht (2005) for innovative German firms, Duguet (2004) about 
French firms’ spending on R&D, Clausen (2007) for Norway, and Takalo, Tanayama and 
Toivanen (2013b) applied to Finnish firms. Not surprisingly, the variety of approaches pre-
sented in these papers leads to a lack of consensus regarding the complementarity or substi-
tutability between public and private R&D expenditures3 (García-Quevedo, 2004; Zúñiga-
Vicente et al., 2014), although most recent analyses suggest that public R&D subsidies suc-
ceed in stimulating private R&D (Becker, 2014).  
In general, this evidence is consistent with the idea that public R&D subsidies consti-
tute a public policy instrument to compensate the negative effect of financial constraints on 
private R&D activities. In this line, Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) indicate that public subsidies 
can be especially relevant for small and young firms, for which liquidity constraints can be 
more severe. Becker (2014, p. 9) also establishes that “the additionality effect has been shown 
to be particularly prevalent for small firms, which are more likely to experience external fi-
nancial constraints. Moreover, these firms are more likely to start investing in R&D if they 
receive a subsidy.”   
With regard to the methodological framework, most of the studies wonder about the 
behavior of firms in terms of R&D expenditure in the absence of aid. As mentioned before, 
when answering this question, the key problem is the so-called “selection problem”, which 
arises from the fact that each firm can only be observed either receiving the aid or not. There-
fore, the additional effect cannot be measured directly. If public support were randomly grant-
                                                
3 Among the reasons behind the multiplicity of results, we can highlight the absence of a generally accepted 
model that can be used when proposing econometrically testable hypotheses (David, Hall and  Toole, 2000), and 
the fact that public programs differ in their objectives, funding schemes and methodology, so it seems reasonable 
that their evaluation also provides different results (Borrás and Edquist, 2013). 
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ed, it would be possible to estimate its effect just by the difference between the average result 
for supported firms and the rest. Notwithstanding, public agencies usually have their own cri-
teria for selecting firms, supporting, for example, i) firms or projects with a higher probability 
of success (picking-the-winners strategy); ii) particular sectors that generate more spillovers; 
or iii) certain groups of firms facing higher financial constraints (in general SME). As a result, 
we need an approximation for the counterfactual when quantifying the impact of public aid; 
that is, we need to take into account that participation in the aid system probably depends on 
the same characteristics of the firm that determine its R&D behavior. The selection of a con-
trol group is quite difficult and could lead to a bias when estimating the impact. 
Another problem, closely related to the previous one, is the endogeneity of public 
funding. Many times, access to public or private financing depends on a similar set of varia-
bles (again, this may be a result of an “appropriate” selection by the public agency). Actually, 
firms awarded aid with higher public funds are those which invest more in R&D, meaning 
that the estimated impact of the public financing has embedded the effect of other variables 
influencing R&D expenditure besides the direct increase derived from the subsidy. Addition-
ally, R&D spillovers may imply changes in the behavior of non-participants in the aid system 
as a result of the conduct of awarded firms.  
As Becker (2014) points out in her recent review, the availability of new econometric 
techniques that control for selection bias is likely one reason for the shift away from earlier 
findings that public subsidies often crowd out private R&D to finding that subsidies typically 
stimulate private R&D. In particular, more recent papers have employed matching estimators 
as a methodological alternative (see Arvanitis, 2013). This procedure is based on comparing 
results between two groups, one of them made up of “treated” individuals (in our case, firms 
participating in the public program) and  the other consisting of a “comparable” control group. 
Under some assumptions4, we can attribute the difference between the results of both groups 
to the “treatment” (the public program). The advantage of this method is that it is not neces-
sary to specify a functional form for the relationship between subsidies and R&D expendi-
tures, while its main difficulty is the construction of the control group. Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) and Czarnitzki and Licht (2005), with innovative German firms, Duguet (2004), for 
French firms with R&D expenditures, Aerts and Schmidt (2008), for Flanders and Germany, 
                                                
4 The distribution of subsidies must be random, conditioned on some characteristics. For each set of firms 
awarded aid (or not) with some characteristics, there should be a “similar” control group as well. 
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Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), applied to Canadian firms, and Carboni (2011), using Italian 
manufacturing data, are examples of this approach.  
The empirical evidence about the impact of public support programs for R&D in Spain 
is in line with international literature, using a variety of approaches. Noteworthy are the stud-
ies by Busom (2000), González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2004), González and Pazó (2008), 
Arqué-Castells and Mohnen (2012) and Arqué-Castells (2013). Busom (2000) takes ad-
vantage of a database containing both firms awarded aid by CDTI grants in 1988 and innova-
tive firms not granted aid. Apart from general technological and economic information, she 
uses information about the strategic attitude and the behavior of each firm in the product’s 
market. However, the magnitude of subsidies is unknown, so only total substitution can be 
tested. Decisions analyzed are both participation and innovative effort. The results suggest 
that small firms have a higher probability of participation and public aid increases private 
innovative effort. Notwithstanding, a total crowding-out effect could not be rejected for 30% 
of the firms. 
In the same way, González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2004) use data from manufacturing 
firms from the ESEE (Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales) between 1990 and 1999. In 
the context of a model with product differentiation, they assume that each competitor is able 
to increase the demand for its products by elevating their quality through R&D investments. 
Demand characteristics, technological opportunities and starting costs for R&D activities in-
teract to determine innovation results and the minimum profit margin. Under this threshold, 
costs cannot be recovered through an increase of sales, meaning the firm will not conduct 
R&D; anyway, the decision may be changed if the expected subsidy reduces R&D costs. A 
Tobit model is implemented to analyze the determinants that lead the firm to develop techno-
logical activities and, once decided, to fix their intensity. As the ESEE provides information 
about the amount of the subsidy, the ex-ante expected subsidy can be estimated by taking into 
account selection and endogeneity problems and these estimations can be used as an explana-
tory variable of the investment effort. The main conclusions are the following: a) by subsidiz-
ing 10% of R&D expenditures, half of large firms without R&D activities would start them; 
b) if we want to achieve this change for 30% of small firms without R&D expenditures, sub-
sidies should jump to 40%; c) 3% of large firms already doing R&D will stop these activities 
if subsidies are withdrawn; and d) in the case that subsidies disappear, 14% of small firms 
performing R&D will stop them. Therefore, subsidies appear to be potentially effective in 
leading firms to conduct R&D activities. Also, they conclude that most of the firms awarded 
 8
aid would have had R&D expenditures even without public aid. This can be seen as a signal 
of a “suitable selection” by risk-adverse public agencies. 
Using matching procedures, González and Pazó (2008) also use the ESEE dataset for 
the period 1990-1999. The main results include an absence of a crowding-out effect, either 
partial or total, strengthening the international evidence obtained with the same methodology. 
On average, subsidized firms’ effort is 0.35 percentage points higher; this is quite significant, 
as the average effort is 2.1% in the absence of a subsidy. Moreover, public financing is more 
effective for small firms operating in low-technology sectors.  
Finally, also for Spain, we can highlight the papers by Arqué-Castells and Mohnen 
(2012) and Arqué-Castells (2013), whose aim is to analyze the impact of subsidies in the 
presence of persistence in innovative activities. Recent papers suggest that being an innovator 
in one period has a positive causal effect on the probability of innovating in the next period 
(Peters, 2009; Raymond et al., 2010). The implication of this fact is that subsidies could be 
particularly effective in fostering private R&D, as a change in the R&D status of the firm 
would also increase the probability of being an R&D performer in the future. In order to test 
this hypothesis, Arqué-Castells and Mohnen (2012) focus on R&D extensive margin and 
model R&D decisions in a dynamic context with sunk entry costs and public aid. By estimat-
ing a dynamic panel data type-2 tobit model for an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufactur-
ing firms observed over the period 1998-2009, they find that 25% of these firms need “exten-
sive” subsidies to start but not to continue doing R&D. In the same line, Arqué-Castells 
(2013) tests for the existence of subsidies’ permanent inducement effects using also panel data 
from the ESEE. His simulations carried out with the estimated parameters show that subsidies 
can generate permanent inducement effects for 9% of Spanish manufacturing firms, being the 
subsidy shares that are needed to generate these effects larger among small firms than among 
large companies. Our analysis in the next sections closely follows this last paper but with the 
focus on the impact of low-interest loans instead of subsidies. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATASETS 
 
Most of the studies described in the previous section analyze the impact of public aid, taking 
into account both endogeneity and selection problems. David, Hall and Toole (2000), Klette, 
Moen and Griliches (2000) and, more recently, Aerts, Czarnitzki and Fier (2007) review the 
main empirical papers about the impact of public subsidies on firms’ R&D expenditures, pay-
ing special attention to the different methodologies applied to avoid these estimation prob-
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lems.5 Among the most usual alternatives, we find Heckman’s (1979) selection model, which 
we will follow in this paper. This methodology is applied in two steps. Firstly, a selection 
equation for the participation status is estimated. In our case, in this estimate we also take into 
account the problem of the existence of unobservable idiosyncratic firm characteristics corre-
lated to their participation (selection problem in presence of unobservables)6. As in the case of 
subsidies, low-interest loans do not have a horizontal character. In fact, they are granted to 
those projects that are better from the agency’s point of view in terms of scientific, technolog-
ic and social welfare criteria. 
Formally, the model consists of two equations. The first is devoted to the participation 
of firm i ( 1,..., )i N  in the CDTI loan system during year t ( 1,..., )t T  and is given by: 
* 2
1 11 i 0 (0, )
0
      
it it it i u
it
f y x u u iid N
y
otherwise
   (1) 
where *ity  is a latent dependent variable, 1itx  represents the set of explanatory variables, 1  is 
the vector of coefficients and itu  is the error term. Firm i will be a participant if 
*
ity  is posi-
tive7. 
In order to measure the stimulus effect of the loan system, the second equation deals 
with the firm’s decision to perform R&D with its own resources. Again, this is formalized 
using a binary model:  
* * 2
2 2ˆ1 i 0 (0, )
0
        
it it it it i e
it
f z y x e e iid N
z
otherwise
  (2) 
where *itz  is a latent variable, 
*ˆity  represents the participation in the low-interest loan sys-
tem, is the parameter reflecting the impact of public aid, 2itx  represents other control varia-
bles (allegedly exogenous or predetermined), and ite  is the error term. Firm i devotes its own 
resources to R&D if *itz  is positive. This latent variable can be understood as the expected net 
profit of the R&D project. 
                                                
5 See also Bertoni, Colombo and Grilli (2011) or Cerulli and Potì (2012). 
6 Not controlling for unobservables leads to inconsistent estimates. Other methodologies, like matching proce-
dures, assume that all the relevant unobservable variables are accurately represented by observable variables 
(Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006). 
7 Ideally, we would like to separately estimate the determinants of the two decisions involved in the probability 
of participation: the firm’s decision to apply for the credit and the agency’s decision to award it. This would 
permit the identification of the effects that explanatory variables have on each decision (Blanes and Busom, 
2004). This can only be done if rejected proposals are also identified in the database. However, in our case, it is 
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Notice that in this second step, the participation variable implemented is not the one 
observed, ity , but the one predicted in the first stage, 
*ˆity . In fact, we are dealing with a selec-
tion (and endogeneity) problem as we can assume the latent variable of the first equation to be 
both an indicator of the R&D project’s quality valued by the agency and its fulfillment of the 
aid program’s criteria. 
Additionally, the impact equation is also estimated using the observed participation as 
an explanatory variable. Thus, comparing the results obtained with both estimates (using the 
predicted or real participation), we will be able to measure the selection bias on this kind of 
analysis. Given that dependent variables are binary and data have a panel structure, we will 
apply the maximum likelihood method to a random effects Probit model to obtain the esti-
mates. 
Another problem when trying to explain the R&D expenditure decision is that R&D 
activities are usually persistent (Geroski, Van Reenen and Walters, 1997). That is, investing in 
R&D in one period increases the probability of investing during the following year. If this 
persistence is not taken into account, it could imply a bias in the estimates of the impact of 
public aid. As it was introduced before, in the presence of this pattern, R&D subsidies could 
be especially effective. If a subsidy induces the firm to change its initial R&D status, this will 
mean a stimulus to continue performing R&D activities in the future (Arqué-Castells and 
Mohnen, 2012). 
The persistence of R&D activities can be due to various reasons. It could emerge be-
cause of sunk costs associated with these activities (Mañez-Castillejo et al., 2009), or maybe 
as a consequence of a learning-by-doing process with them. In this case, we would say there 
is “true” state dependence, as investing in one period will “cause” a higher probability of in-
vesting the next. Persistence could arise because of heterogeneity, observable or unobserva-
ble, between firms as well. Firms may have some characteristics (size, activity, technological 
opportunities, attitude towards risk) that make them keener on having R&D expenditures. If 
those characteristics are persistent over time, the induced decision about R&D investment will 
also be persistent. We can introduce firms’ characteristics in the model as control variables, 
but if some of them are unobservable (like attitude towards risk or business capacity), their 
omission could bias the results. In this case, we would say there is “spurious” state depend-
ence. 
                                                                                                                                                     
not possible to match CDTI and INE databases for rejected proposals, so we can only estimate the net effect of 
explanatory variables on the probability of participation.  
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Taking into account the existence of persistence, we follow Wooldridge’s (2005) 
methodology, estimating a random effects dynamic Probit model8. Then, equation (2) would 
be: 
* *
1 2 2ˆ1 i 0
0
          
it it it it i it
it
f z z y x e
z
otherwise
   (2’) 
where the R&D expenditure decision depends on the decision made last year 1itz , on some 
observable variables included on the vector 2itx  and on some firm’s specific unobservable 
characteristics that are assumed to be constant over time and are represented by i . Following 
Wooldridge, we specify the distribution of i , assuming unobservable heterogeneity depends 
on the initial condition 0iz  and some strictly exogenous variables in this way: 
*
0 1 0 2 2 3
2 *
2(0, ) and  uncorrelated  with   and 
     
 
    

i i i i i
i i i
z y x
iid N y x
      (3) 
where *iy  and 2ix  represent averages of 
*ˆity  and 2itx , respectively. The resulting equation sub-
stituting (3) in (2’) will be estimated as a random effects Probit model where 1itz , 
*ˆity , 2itx , 
0iz , 
*
iy  and 2ix  are the explanatory variables. Obtaining a statistically positive estimate for   
would confirm the hypothesis of persistence due to true state dependence. Additionally, once 
the persistence effect has been discounted, parameter   would gather the impact of public 
aid. 
Below, we describe the sample of firms used for econometric analysis along with the 
explanatory variables employed as regressors. The selection of those factors is guided by both 
the empirical evidence available for other public support programs and the descriptive analy-




Three data sources for the years 2002 to 2005 are used in this work: the CDTI database, the 
EIT (Encuesta de Innovación Tecnológica) database, compiled by the INE (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística), which is the Spanish version of the Community Innovation Survey, and the 
PITEC (Panel de Innovación Tecnológica) database, also collected by the INE on the basis of 
                                                
8 This methodology has been already implemented when dealing with innovative firms. See Peters (2009). 
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the annual responses to the Spanish Innovation survey under FECYT and Cotec sponsorship. 
The CDTI collects information related to Spanish firms’ participation in its financing pro-
grams. Specifically, during the period analyzed, the CDTI managed five types of low-interest 
loans: Technological Development Projects (TDP), Technological Innovation Projects (TIP) 
and Joint Industrial Research Projects (JIRP), Neotec projects and Technological Promotion 
Projects. In Table 1 the number of projects on each typology is shown yearly. 
 
Table 1: Number of financed projects by typology  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Technological Development (TDP) 189 240 271 273 973 
Technological Innovation (TIP) 12 9 52 69 142 
Joint Industrial Research (JIRP) 37 33 61 51 182 
Neotec 16 18 21 26 81 
Technological Promotion 21 14 15 19 69 
Total 275 314 420 438 1,447 
 Source: CDTI database and own elaboration. 
 
 
This information has been completed with records from the Spanish Innovation Sur-
vey from 2002 to 2005. Moreover, INE provided a control sample of firms not receiving aid. 
These data from the INE were anonymized for some variables, so firms from the control sam-
ple cannot be identified. This process introduces two main modifications: a) replacement of 
individual original values for six quantitative variables (Sales, Exports, Gross investment in 
material goods, Number of employees, Total expenditure in innovation and Total employees 
on R&D) with data obtained by a hiding process;9 b) for the remaining quantitative variables, 
absolute values are replaced by percentages referring to aggregate values. 
 Finally, some available information in the PITEC database has been used to construct 
sectorial indicators of firms’ valuation for some elements that could be hindering R&D activi-
ties. Due to the anonymization process, we are forced to use PITEC’s information just to con-
struct sectorial indicators assigned to each firm through its activity code. 
                                                
9 The hiding process implies replacing the firm-level observations with arithmetic means, which are calculated in 
the following way for each of the variables. Firstly, the variable provided is the arithmetic mean of the values of 
the 5 firms with the highest values in the variable in question according to the firm’s activity (at two digits). If 
any activity has less than 3 firms, regardless of the firm’s activity, the rest of the firm records are ranked in de-
creasing order according to the variable to be simulated, and the variable provided is the arithmetic mean of the 3 
or 4 consecutive values. The expected biases due to this anonymization are small, as shown by López (2011) 
through the comparison of regressions that alternatively use original and harmonized data from the Spanish In-
novation Survey. 
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After merging the databases, the sample includes 5,689 observations, 2,429 firms and 
499 awarded projects, representing 8.7% of the whole sample. For reasons of homogeneity, 
for ulterior analysis only TDP, TIP and JIRP typologies are selected. 
 
3.2. The Variables 
 
The selection of variables is based on the literature and is usually determined by the availabil-
ity of information in databases. The empirical literature about the impact of participation in 
public aid programs on R&D highlights some firms’ characteristics that could affect the ap-
plication and/or the agencies’ selection of projects (Blanes and Busom, 2004; González, Jau-
mandreu and Pazó, 2005; Heijs, 2005; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2005; Clausen, 2007; Huergo and 
Trenado, 2010; Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen, 2013b).  
First, it is common to use indicators to denote the firm’s technological profile, as ap-
plication would be more probable when the propensity to perform R&D projects is higher. 
Given the information available in our database, we use internal R&D investment per em-
ployee and an indicator reflecting whether the firm has technological cooperative agree-
ments10; the latter could be a complementary strategy to internal R&D expenditures (Cas-
siman and Veugelers, 2002). Additionally, the patents application has been considered as a 
measurement of technological output that indirectly shows the firm’s innovative intensity. In 
addition, if the objective of the public agency was to support “national champions”, then it 
would be prone to finance those R&D projects with a higher probability of commercial or 
technological success, and having applied for patents could be signaling just this. As can be 
seen in Table 2, the sample mean of all these indicators is higher for participants than for non-
participants. 
Variables reflecting a firm’s financial situation are also commonly considered, particu-
larly when financial constraints are present. As we mentioned in previous sections, R&D ac-
tivities imply high commercial and technical risks. There is no certainty about the achieve-
ment of technological objectives and, even if projects finish successfully, these results may 
not be profitable due to the lack of demand and/or competitors’ reaction in terms of new in-
ventions. Consequently, financially healthy firms would be in better conditions to undertake 
larger investments in R&D. In this sense, financial aid received by awarded firms may imply 
                                                
10 In the estimations, lagged values of both variables are included to avoid simultaneity.  
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a significant incentive for financially constrained firms, increasing their probability of per-
forming technological activities and, therefore, of asking for these credits. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Non-participants Participants 
Internal R&D expenditures per employee (logs.) (t-1) 3.6 (4.0) 6.7 (3.3) 
Technological cooperation (%) 38.4 (48.7) 67.5 (46.9) 
Patent application (%) 21.9 (41.4) 43.3 (49.6) 
Innovation difficulties: Financial 1.43 (0.28) 1.61 (0.17) 
Innovation difficulties: Knowledge 1.07 (0.18) 1.18 (0.13) 
Innovation difficulties: Market 1.10 (0.12) 1.16 (0.08) 
Size (number of employees) 416.6 (1,175.6) 293.76 (801.3)
Start-up (%) 3.2 (17.7) 4.0 (19.6) 
Exports (logs.) (t-1) 7.1 (7.5) 11.9 (6.8) 
Experience with CDTI funding (%) 17.1 (37.6) 73.7 (44.1) 
Experience with other agencies’ funding (%) 26.9 (44.3) 48.3 (50.0) 
Foreign capital (%) 17.3 (37.9) 16.0 (36.7) 
Group membership (%) 41.8 (49.3) 50.3 (50.1) 
R&D performer with own resources (%) 44.0 (49.7) 83.6 (37.1) 
Source: CDTI, EIT and PITEC databases, and own elaboration. 
Note: Sample averages (Standard deviations). (%) indicates the percentage of observations. The indicators of 
innovation difficulties take values from 1 to 4. 
 
Furthermore, financial difficulties could be important for agencies awarding aid. Ob-
viously, R&D-related market failures are a fundamental rationale for public intervention. In 
particular, this support is justified by (i) the incomplete appropriability of R&D outputs due to 
both knowledge spillovers and the existing gap between private and public return and (ii) the 
cost of capital when the investor and the innovation financer are not the same. Hall (2002) 
shows that these market failures are stronger for financially constrained small firms and tech-
nology-intensive start-ups. If this is true, we would expect a negative effect of liquidity, size 
and age on the probability of being awarded aid. As a consequence, the expected effect of 
financial constraints on application is ambiguous. 
Although we do not have information about firms’ financial conditions in our data-
base, we have constructed a sectorial indicator by means of PITEC information based on the 
relative importance assigned by firms during the year to the lack of funds in the firm or group, 
the lack of external financing or the existence of high innovation costs as factors hampering 
innovation. For each factor, we assign a number that varies from one (not relevant) to four 
(high importance). The sectorial indicator is computed as the simple average of firms’ values 
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on each 2-digit NACE sector during the year. As can be seen in Table 2, financial difficulties 
are slightly higher for participants.  
Additionally, two other indicators of innovation difficulties have been constructed 
with the same methodology. The first is related to the troubles in obtaining appropriate 
equipment and knowledge to carry out the project (indicator of knowledge difficulties). The 
second reflects the problems of profiting from innovation results when the market is dominat-
ed by established firms or due to uncertainty with respect to the demand of goods and services 
(indicator of market difficulties). Again, both indicators are higher among participants, alt-
hough the differences are small. 
Regarding the sectorial dimension, another possible objective of agencies could be the 
technological updating of firms in traditional or declining sectors (Blanes and Busom, 2004), 
whereby the agencies try to increase their probability of survival and avoid employment loss-
es. Firms in traditional sectors tend to be bigger and older, and in Spain are mainly located in 
the manufacturing sector. In this case, we would expect firms operating in these sectors to 
have more chances of being awarded aid. 
Overall, a firm’s size is a characteristic present in most of the papers which deal with 
the impact of public funding, although its effect on participation is not clear: large firms usu-
ally have more resources with which to undertake R&D projects and apply for the aid, but 
SMEs are usually more affected by innovation-related market failures, so their benefits from 
public aid could be higher. Statistics in Table 2 show that awarded firms are smaller although 
both participants and non-participants are, on average, large firms; this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that size reduces the probability of being awarded aid. 
The expected effect of a firm’s age is also ambiguous. Older (more experienced) firms 
are more likely to know and to use public aid. Moreover, they usually have better financial 
alternatives as external investors can rely more on their track record than in the case of start-
ups (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2005). However, young firms tend to be more financially con-
strained and, as a consequence, they could apply for and receive public aid more frequently. 
The information in our databases allows us to know whether the firm was born during the last 
three years. If this is the case, we consider the firm to be a start-up. Table 2 shows that the 
percentage of start-ups is slightly higher among participants, never going beyond 4%.  
Another aspect that should be considered is the firm’s competitive position in the ref-
erence market, which could be captured by its market share, the evolution of sales or the ex-
porting activity. The key question here is what to expect. Will firms with more market power 
participate more in public programs? Regarding international competition, the expected an-
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swer for exporters will be affirmative, for at least two reasons. Their position in international 
markets could be a signal of their ability to transform innovations into successful products 
(Czarnitzki and Licht, 2005). Also, they could be facing lower application costs as they are 
more experienced in dealing with bureaucracy when compared with non-exporters (Takalo, 
Tanayama and Toivanen, 2013b). In our sample, the presence of firms with foreign activity is 
clearly higher among participants (see Table 2). 
The learning effect is also considered in many studies through indicators of previous 
participation in the same or similar programs. The application for different public aid implies 
both high administrative burdens and operative tasks that experienced firms could have incor-
porated into their routines (contracting experts, systematic monitoring, etc.). Generally, it is 
assumed that previous experience reduces application costs. When assessing the impact of 
R&D subsidies in Finland, Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2013b) find that the number of 
past applications has a non-linear effect on application costs, first increasing and then decreas-
ing them, which could suggest that a “learning-by-doing” process is taking place. 
Trying to take previous experience with the R&D aid system into account, two 
measures are used in this paper. Both are dummy variables taking the value one when, during 
the last year, the firm gets: 1) a CDTI loan; 2) financial aid from other organizations. As can 
be noticed in Table 2, the proportion of firms in the sample with previous “experience with 
CDTI” is larger for participants (73.7) than for non-participants (17.1). Moreover, firms fi-
nanced by other institutions are again more frequent among participants, although the differ-
ences are not very large. 
Finally, additional control variables are introduced. Time dummy variables are includ-
ed, allowing for business cycle effects or changes in the CDTI budget. As an indicator of the 
ease of access to external capital markets, possibly meaning better knowledge of the public 
aid system, a dummy variable representing the presence of foreign capital among shareholders 
is incorporated. For the same reason, an indicator of business group membership for each firm 
is considered. 
Note that some of these variables might be correlated between each other. In this re-
gard, the numbers of Table 3 reveal that pairwise correlations are reasonably low. The only 
exceptions are the correlations among the different types of innovation difficulties, which is 
not surprising given that these indicators have sectoral dimension instead of firm dimension. 
This will be taken into account for the interpretation of the results presented in the following 
section. The rest of the correlations are all below 0.5. 
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Table 3: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
[1] Internal R&D expenditures per employee (logs) (t-1) 1.000               
[2] Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.434 1.000              
[3] Patent application 0.335 0.243 1.000             
[4] Innovation difficulties: Financial 0.371 0.226 0.243 1.000            
[5] Innovation difficulties: Knowledge 0.324 0.203 0.260 0.863 1.000           
[6] Innovation difficulties: Market 0.281 0.151 0.208 0.777 0.722 1.000          
[7] High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.302 0.196 0.247 0.405 0.379 0.326 1.000         
[8] High-tech services 0.123 0.031 0.016 0.279 0.047 0.222 -0.104 1.000        
[9] Size (number of employees in log) -0.289 -0.069 -0.065 -0.107 -0.105 -0.082 0.024 -0.051 1.000       
[10] Start-up 0.131 0.059 0.045 0.039 0.005 0.033 -0.007 0.099 -0.180 1.000      
[11] Export (logs) (t-1) 0.268 0.194 0.262 0.313 0.399 0.245 0.328 -0.108 0.115 -0.084 1.000     
[12] Experience with CDTI funding 0.389 0.295 0.229 0.312 0.277 0.223 0.279 0.089 -0.008 0.057 0.254 1.000    
[13] Experience with other agencies' funding 0.303 0.221 0.115 0.032 -0.015 0.006 0.034 0.073 -0.336 0.109 0.006 0.255 1.000   
[14] Foreign capital -0.073 -0.015 0.004 -0.040 -0.021 0.006 0.132 -0.024 0.307 -0.040 0.180 -0.039 -0.122 1.000  
[15] Group membership -0.051 0.072 0.031 -0.058 -0.051 -0.078 0.078 -0.009 0.434 -0.015 0.149 0.058 -0.116 0.446 1.000 
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Regarding the R&D investment decision, theoretical works (Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 
1994, Klepper, 1996) suggest including variables related basically to technological environ-
ment, market conditions, financial constraints, appropriability of technological returns and 
size (reflecting R&D economies of scale) as determinants. In our case, the dependent variable 
is a dummy that indicates whether the firm has self-financed internal R&D during the year11.  
As in the participation equation, with the usual control variables (size dummies, be-
longing to high-tech sectors, year, the firm’s ownership, group membership and foreign capi-
tal), an indicator of newly born firms (start-ups) is included, trying to capture differences in 
the investment behavior for them. Empirical evidence suggests that start-ups are usually 
among the most innovative firms; their survival probability as well as their growth rate de-
pend strongly on their innovative behavior (Audretsch, 1995, Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004). 
Representing environment features, a variable reflecting exporting firms is added, as firms 
operating in competitive international markets have more incentives to innovate and therefore 
to invest in R&D. 
Given the aim of this paper, special attention is devoted to a firm’s participation in the 
CDTI low-interest loan system. This aid, as a tool that reduces a firm’s financial constraints, 
could increase the chances of performing R&D. As can be seen in Table 2, the proportion of 




In this section, we present the results of the estimation of our model. Given the binary charac-
ter of the dependent variable, and taking into account the panel structure of the data, the prob-
ability of participation (equation (1)) is estimated as a random effects Probit model.  
The results are summarized in Table 4, showing marginal effects. In the first column, 
the coefficients correspond to the whole sample. In the second and third columns, estimates 
for two sub-samples are presented, SMEs (with a number of employees between 10 and 200) 
and large firms (more than 200 employees), while in the last two columns, we distinguish 
between manufacturing and services firms.  
                                                
11 We leave the analysis of the impact on R&D intensity for future research. The type of public aid here is not a 
direct subsidy but a loan that must be paid back, so we should consider the principal of the credit part of the 
company's own R&D resources. To study the effect on the intensity of R&D investment, we would first need to 
calculate the equivalent subsidy corresponding to the low-interest loan awarded. Unfortunately, this information 
is missing from our databases. 
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Table 4: Probability of participation in the CDTI low-interest loans system 
 All firms  SMEs Large Firms Manufacturing firms Services firms 
  dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E. 
Internal R&D expenditures per employee (t-1) 0.002 *** 0.010 0.001  0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 0.004 ** 0,002 0.001 * 0.0004 
Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.011 ** 0.065 0.019 * 0.010 0.004  0.006 0.020 * 0,012 0.001  0.003 
Patent application 0.005  0.064 0.006  0.010 0.004  0.006 0.009  0,012 0.0002  0.003 
Innovation  
difficulties 
Financial 0.056 ** 0.322 0.122 ** 0.053 0.015  0.021 0.150 ** 0.076 0.017  0.014 
Knowledge 0.047  0.373 -0.061  0.059 0.081 *** 0.029 0.010  0.080 -0.001  0.030 
Market -0.068 * 0.484 -0.011  0.080 -0.057  0.035 -0.182  0.111 -0.038  0.026 
Activity sector 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.018 *** 0.074 0.044 *** 0.015 -0.004  0.005 0.030 ** 0.015   
High-tech services -0.005  0.176 -0.022  0.020 0.023  0.029   -0.0003  0.004 
Size (number of employees in log) 0.038 *** 0.115 0.171 *** 0.059 -0.014  0.031 0.061 *** 0.023 0.011 ** 0.004 
Size squared -0.003 *** 0.012 -0.018 ** 0.007 0.001  0.002 -0.005 ** 0.002 -0.001 ** 0.0004 
Start-up 0.010 0.157 0.023  0.028    0.003  0.034 0.008  0.009 
Exports (logs) (t-1) 0.001 *** 0.005 0.002 ** 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 -0.0001  0.0002 
Experience with CDTI funding 0.128 *** 0.065 0.123 *** 0.016 0.135 *** 0.024 0.175 *** 0.016 0.089 *** 0.028 
Experience with other agencies’ funding 0.020 *** 0.065 0.033 *** 0.011 0.004  0.006 0.035 *** 0.013 0.010 * 0.005 
Year 2004 0.018 *** 0.077 0.017  0.013 0.019 *** 0.008 0.039 ** 0.016 0.001  0.003 
Year 2005 0.024 *** 0.071 0.021 * 0.011 0.026 *** 0.008 0.064 *** 0.015 -0.001  0.003 
Foreign capital -0.010  0.088 -0.017  0.014 -0.002  0.005 -0.027 ** 0.014 -0.002  0.003 
Group membership 0.003  0.069 0.017  0.011 -0.002  0.005 0.002  0.013 -0.0002  0.003 
Sigma_u 0.195 0.016 0.192 0.020 0.198 0.027 0.183 0.018 0.226 0.089 
Rho 0.037 0.006 0.036 0.007 0.038 0.010 0.032 0.006 0.048 0.036 
Log. Likelihood -1,245.76 -767.01 -413.85 -1,018.92 -174.41 
Number of observations (firms) 5,689 (2,429) 2,739 (1,337) 2,511 (976) 3,017 (1,273) 2,253 (1,002) 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at : 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummy variable for year 2003 is excluded. Marginal 
effects (dy/dx) are computed at the sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1. Rho stands for the proportion of the total 
variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. 
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The first fact that can be highlighted from Table 4 is the positive effect of having a 
higher technological profile on the probability of participation. Both R&D expenditure and 
technological cooperation agreements during the last year have a statistically positive impact 
for the whole sample. When we distinguish by size, the effect of internal R&D expenditure is 
only positive for large firms, suggesting their better position to lead R&D projects that require 
huge investments. On the contrary, technological cooperation affects SMEs’ propensity to 
participate, but has no impact in the case of large firms. This is coherent with the idea that, 
through these agreements, SMEs find additional resources (financial, informational and hu-
man) that make them capable of undertaking projects that were maybe impossible on their 
own. Specifically, having conducted those agreements in the last year increases their probabil-
ity of being awarded aid by around 2 percentage points. 
Regarding financial constraints, our sectorial indicator refers to the lack of internal or 
external funds and also to the presence of large innovation costs. The important positive im-
pact of this indicator on the probability of participation could be explained by two factors: 1) 
firms with financial problems could try to solve them by applying for public aid; 2) the CDTI 
plays an important role in financing firms that belong to those sectors affected by market fail-
ures that prevent the volume invested in R&D to reach the social optimum, and these sectors 
are usually the more financially constrained ones. As is shown by the results, the effect is par-
ticularly strong for SMEs and manufacturers. 
On the contrary, sectorial market problems affect all firms negatively. This suggests 
that, generally, firms have a lower probability of being awarded aid if they operate in sectors 
where either information about markets is lacking or established firms have a dominant posi-
tion or the demand for innovative goods/services is uncertain. This is probably due to the 
lower incentive to conduct R&D projects in these sectors, which makes it less useful for firms 
to apply for public aid. However, this result must be interpreted with caution, given the high 
correlation among sectoral indicators of innovation difficulties shown in Table 3. 
Another interesting result in Table 4 is the existence of a non-linear effect of size: as 
firms are larger, they have a higher probability of being awarded aid, but the increase in size 
affects the probability of obtaining CDTI financing marginally less. This effect confirms the 
existence of entry barriers when applying for public R&D support. Applying for CDTI loans 
has some costs in terms of time and searching for information, so larger firms will have a 
higher probability of participation, although as a certain amount of resources is obtained, the 
size effect is smaller. As a consequence, when splitting the sample into small and large firms, 
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the effect is only statistically significant for SMEs. On the contrary, this result is maintained 
for both the services and manufacturing sub-samples. 
The start-up indicator seems to have no effect in any analyzed sample or sub-sample. 
As previously mentioned, the expected effect of this variable is ambiguous: although more 
experienced firms are more keen to be aware of these aid programs, younger firms are usually 
more financially constrained, having more incentives to apply then. In this sense, notice that 
our sample does not include firms supported by the NEOTEC program, which is specifically 
designed to provide financial resources to technological start-ups. 
A firm’s competitive position in international markets is also an outstanding determi-
nant of participation in the CDTI low-interest loan system. More in detail, exports increase 
the probability of being awarded aid, especially for manufacturing and SME. On the contrary, 
for services and large firms, their effect is not statistically significant. In this sense, for large 
firms, being an exporter is not a distinguishing feature, while for SMEs it is clearly influenced 
by a firm’s characteristics. In the case of services, non-exporting firms dominate the sample 
clearly, representing 75% of the observations. 
The effect of previous experience, either with the CDTI or other institutions, is evident 
in all estimates. As expected, being financed by the CDTI in the recent past increases the 
probability of being awarded aid again substantially. Actually, this effect is 12.8 percentage 
points for the whole sample and takes its maximum value (17.5 points) for manufacturers. 
Previous experience with other institutions also affects the chances of receiving CDTI funds 
positively, although the magnitude of the impact is lower (2 percentage points). Obviously, 
expected cuts in application costs due to the learning effect are higher when the aid system is 
the same. 
Finally, regarding control variables, time dummies reflect the increase in the probabil-
ity of being awarded aid as of 2004, which is due to the spectacular increase in the CDTI 
budget since this year. It seems that the availability of new funds has favored relatively more 
manufacturing than services firms. In fact, high-tech manufacturing firms increase their prob-
ability of participation 1.8 percentage points (4.4 for SME), strengthening this idea. Analyz-
ing a firm’s capital break-down, the presence of foreign capital has a negative effect for man-
ufacturing, while it has no impact when splitting the sample by size. Group membership does 
not have a significant effect on any of the estimates. 
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4.1. The decision to perform R&D activities 
 
Once the first stage is completed, we analyze the determinants of the decision to self-finance 
R&D. Again, a random effects Probit model is used in order to estimate equation (2). Tables 
5, 6 and 7 show estimates for the whole sample, distinguishing, as before, by size and sector. 
In each table, the first column shows the results when observed participation is used as the 
key explanatory variable. These estimates are included for reasons of comparison, as in this 
case we are not taking into account endogeneity or selection problems, and therefore the esti-
mated impact for participation in the public system of low-interest loans will probably be bi-
ased. The results in the second column are obtained following Heckman’s (1979) approach,  
and gathers the alternative estimates when the predicted probability of participation from the 
first stage is considered instead of the observed participation status. Comparing the estimates 
in these columns, selection and simultaneity biases can be assessed. Finally, column (3) 
shows the results when estimating equation (2’) following Wooldridge (2005), enabling us to 
take into account the persistence in the decision to invest in R&D. 
When comparing the first two columns of Table 5, two main conclusions can be out-
lined: first, being awarded CDTI aid clearly increases the probability of conducting R&D ac-
tivities with one’s own resources, using either the observed or the predicted participation vari-
able; second, the estimation under specification (1) has a positive bias that is corrected when 
applying the two-stage procedure. That is, if the selection bias is not taken into account, the 
impact of participation is underestimated. 
Another interesting feature relates to presence in international markets. In the second 
column of Table 5, it is shown that firms involved in exporting activities during the last year 
are 22.8 percentage points more likely to self-finance internal R&D activities, stressing the 
complementarity between internationalization and R&D investment strategies. At the same 
time, although being a start-up seems to have a positive impact in column (1), it loses its sig-
nificance when taking into account the selection problem. 
 When dealing with the estimates for sub-samples according to size (Table 6), the se-
lection bias is again positive for both SMEs and large firms, although it is higher for the for-
mer group. Previous participation in the CDTI system increases the probability of self-
financing internal R&D activities 74.6 percentage points for SMEs and 61.5 for large firms, 
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against the 78.9 percentage points obtained for the whole sample12. Actually, in terms of ob-
served participation, the estimated effect is higher for large firms, while the impact appears to 
be stronger for SMEs when correcting for the selection bias. This result is consistent with 
previous evidence that indicates that public funding should be especially important for small 
firms, which are expected to face more liquidity constraints (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; 
Becker, 2014).   
 
Table 5: Probability of performing R&D 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E. dy/dx  S. E.
Observed participation 0.431 *** 0.147     
Predicted participation    0.789 *** 0.105 0.249 *** 0.063
R&D performer (t-1)       0.532 *** 0.075
Year 2004 -0.145 *** 0.075 -0.258 *** 0.078 -0.073 *** 0.063
Year 2005 -0.223 *** 0.074 -0.398 *** 0.082 -0.104 *** 0.066
Size 
10-49 employees -0.204 *** 0.186 -0.492 *** 0.181 -0.220 *** 0.106
50-99 employees -0.156 * 0.234 -0.422 *** 0.233 -0.235 *** 0.138
100-199 employees -0.224 *** 0.251 -0.410 *** 0.251 -0.236 *** 0.150
200-499 employees -0.383 *** 0.215 -0.604 *** 0.209 -0.208 *** 0.122
> 500 employees -0.373 *** 0.242 -0.472 *** 0.231 -0.200 *** 0.133
Activity 
sector 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.652 *** 0.165 0.097 * 0.151 0.065 ** 0.074
High-tech services 0.614 *** 0.288 0.348 *** 0.254 0.146 *** 0.126
Exporter (t-1) 0.573 *** 0.141 0.228 *** 0.123 0.076 *** 0.060
Start-up 0.374 *** 0.315 0.112  0.281 -0.004  0.134
Foreign capital -0.268 *** 0.187 -0.004  0.169 -0.026  0.083
Group membership 0.197 *** 0.125 0.077 * 0.114 0.041 * 0.062
R&D performer in 2002     0.218 *** 0.090
Sigma_u 2.230 0.085 1.820 0.077 0.430 0.093 
Rho 0.833 0.011 0.768 0.015 0.156 0.057 
Log. Likelihood -2,535.53 -2,276.70 -1,952.54 
Number of observations (firms) 5,689 (2,429) 5,689 (2,429) 5,689 (2,429) 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at : 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the 
constant. Dummy variable for year 2003 is excluded. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at the sample 
means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1. Rho stands for the pro-
portion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. 
 
 
                                                
12 The whole sample also includes micro-firms with fewer than 10 employees and firms in agricultural, construc-
tion and public services. 
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Table 6: Probability of performing R&D by size 
 
   SMEs Large firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. 
Observed participation 0.341 *** 0.047        0.514 *** 0.112       
Predicted participation    0.746 *** 0.063 0.268 *** 0.032    0.615 *** 0.065 0.217 *** 0.032 
R&D performer (t-1)       0.519 *** 0.027       0.483 *** 0.063 
Year 2004 -0.202 *** 0.041 -0.270 *** 0.040 -0.057 * 0.034 0.005  0.028 -0.189 *** 0.029 -0.047  0.034 
Year 2005 -0.232 *** 0.040 -0.350 *** 0.039 -0.046  0.034 -0.032  0.026 -0.286 *** 0.035 -0.122 *** 0.034 
Size 
50-99 employees 0.076  0.068 -0.254 *** 0.065 -0.067  0.042      
100-199 employees 0.022  0.082 -0.280 *** 0.073 -0.070  0.047      
> 500 employees     -0.003  0.044 -0.006  0.042 -0.035  -0.003 
Activity sector 
High / medium-tech manufacturing 0.500 *** 0.048 0.044 * 0.084 0.020 * 0.043 0.829 *** 0.055 0.396 *** 0.089 0.168 *** 0.829 
Hi-tech services 0.504 *** 0.033 0.430 *** 0.062 0.218 *** 0.060 0.497 ** 0.227 -0.045  0.091 0.026  0.497 
Exporter (t-1) 0.550 *** 0.053 0.318 *** 0.062 0.109 *** 0.034 0.486 *** 0.056 0.072  0.049 0.043  0.034 
Start-up 0.272 * 0.120 0.146 ** 0.148 0.010  0.079 -0.129  0.042 -0.132   0.057 -0.106  0.097 
Foreign capital -0.153  0.119 0.074 * 0.116 0.016  0.061 -0.222 *** 0.044 -0.091 ** 0.045 -0.071 ** 0.034 
Group membership 0.174 *** 0.062 -0.010  0.064 -0.010  0.036 0.145 *** 0.040 0.108 *** 0.039 0.073 ** 0.032 
R&D performer in 2002        0.186 *** 0.038      0.317 *** 0.079 
Sigma_u 2.118 0.125 1.921 0.127 0.582 0.066 2.511 0.123 1.731 0.104 0.361 0.211 
Rho 0.818 0.018 0.787 0.022 0.253 0.043 0.863 0.012 0.750 0.023 0.115 0.119 
Log. Likelihood -1,362.06 -1,282.55 -1,141.56 -899.51 -709.32 -560.16 
Number of observations (firms) 2,739 (1.337) 2,739 (1.337) 2,739 (1.337) 2,511 (976) 2,511 (976) 2,511 (976) 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at : 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummy variable for year 2003 is excluded. Marginal 
effects (dy/dx) are computed at the sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1. Rho stands for the proportion of the total 
variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. 
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The selection bias is also positive for manufacturing firms (Table 7). Not correcting 
for the bias leads to underestimating the stimulus induced by low-interest CDTI loans. The 
two-stage estimate shows that manufacturing firms increase their probability of investing in 
R&D 75 percentage points if they have obtained CDTI aid (a number much larger than 19.5, 
the one obtained using the observed participation). Nonetheless, for services, the bias has the 
opposite sign; when selection is taken into account, the effect falls to 16.9 percentage points, 
being overestimated when the bias is ignored. The higher effect obtained with the real partici-
pation for services is inverted when taking care of the selection bias. 
Column (3) in Tables 5, 6 and 7 analyzes the determinants of the probability of per-
forming R&D, allowing for the existence of persistence in this decision. To do so, the lagged 
value of the investment decision in the previous year is included. As can be noticed, the coef-
ficient for this variable is always positive, confirming the existence of true state dependence. 
In particular, firms investing one year are around 50 percentage points more likely to invest in 
the next period also. Besides, the impact of CDTI aid is still significant, although its size is 
lower in all cases. For the whole sample, firms getting loans are 24.9 percentage points more 
likely to invest their own resources in R&D. When distinguishing by size, a greater impact is 
shown for SMEs (26.8) than for large firms (21.7). By activity, while the impact is still large 
for manufacturing, for services the effect is reduced to 9.6 percentage points. Although con-
temporaneous impacts of public loans reduce their strength, their effect is still important as 
they can induce firms to conduct R&D activities continuously.  
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Table 7: Probability of performing R&D by activity 
   Manufacturing firms Services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. dy/dx   S.E. 
Observed participation 0.195 *** 0.028        0.409 *** 0.167        
Predicted participation    0.750 *** 0.060 0.295 *** 0.033    0.169 *** 0.029 0.096 *** 0.017 
R&D performer (t-1)       0.492 *** 0.033       0.478 *** 0.034 
Year 2004 -0.075 ** 0.031 -0.230 *** 0.037 -0.059 * 0.032 -0.051 *** 0.013 -0.059 *** 0.014 -0.046 * 0.023 
Year 2005 -0.121 *** 0.031 -0.414 *** 0.040 -0.118 *** 0.034 -0.094 *** 0.020 -0.088 *** 0.019 -0.047 * 0.023 
Size 
10-49 employees -0.160 *   0.099 -0.496 *** 0.096 -0.207 *** 0.064 -0.048 ** 0.020 -0.129 *** 0.026 -0.097 *** 0.027 
50-99 employees -0.122  0.121 -0.686 *** 0.079 -0.243 *** 0.076 -0.019  0.030 -0.064 *** 0.014 -0.071   0.038 
100-199 employees 0.093  0.086 -0.535 *** 0.121 -0.147 * 0.086 -0.065 *** 0.015 -0.082 *** 0.016 -0.153 *** 0.015 
200-499 employees -0.060  0.109 -0.553 *** 0.108 -0.103  0.072 -0.166 *** 0.030 -0.261 *** 0.036 -0.153 *** 0.027 
> 500 employees -0.088  0.137 -0.626 *** 0.103 -0.163 * 0.088 -0.108 *** 0.023 -0.165 *** 0.028 -0.118 *** 0.028 
Activity sector 
High / medium-tech manufacturing 0.361 *** 0.041 0.120 ** 0.050 0.065 ** 0.031     
Hi-tech services     0.623 *** 0.094 0.211 *** 0.080 0.106 *** 0.040 
Exporter (t-1) 0.473 *** 0.080 0.229 *** 0.079 0.087 ** 0.040 0.169 *** 0.039 0.142 *** 0.033 0.050 ** 0.021 
Start-up 0.142  0.074 -0.015  0.148 -0.029  0.083 0.325 *** 0.140 0.091  0.080 0.039  0.047 
Foreign capital -0.196 ** 0.088 0.070  0.067 0.007  0.043 -0.073 *** 0.017 -0.052 **  0.017 -0.054 * 0.027 
Group membership 0.097 * 0.049 0.007  0.052 0.005  0.034 0.062 *** 0.026 0.058 *** 0.024 0.049 ** 0.024 
R&D performer in 2002         0.265 *** 0.040         0.132 *** 0.029 
Sigma_u 2.256 0.100 1.941 0.121 0.584 0.067 1.898 0.126 1.633 0.111 0.215 0.065 
Rho 0.836 0.014 0.789 0.021 0.254 0.044 0.783 0.022 0.727 0.027 0.044 0.025 
Log. Likelihood -1,432.85 -1,311.45 -1,158.94 -838.38 -779.44 -631.36 
Number of observations (firms) 3,017 (1,273) 3,017 (1,273) 3,017 (1,273) 2,253 (1,002) 2,253 (1,002) 2,253 (1,002) 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at : 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummy variable for year 2003 is excluded. Marginal 
effects (dy/dx) are computed at the sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1. Rho stands for the proportion of the total 




The aim of this paper is to determine the effect of firms’ participation in CDTI loans on their 
decision to invest in R&D. The analysis considers that participation probably depends on the 
same firm characteristics that determine their investment behavior. To do this, two equations 
are estimated for a panel of Spanish firms that are observed during the period 2002-2005. The 
first describes firms’ participation in the CDTI low-interest loan system for Technological 
Development Projects, Technological Innovation Projects and Joint Industrial Research Pro-
jects. The second analyzes the determinants of the firm’s decision to invest in R&D, self-
financing the expenditure at least partially. 
It is also taken into account that the spending decision could present some persistence, 
i.e., firms with positive expenditures the previous year have a higher probability of investing 
again. This could be attributed to either the existence of sunk costs associated with R&D ac-
tivities or to the learning process. If this is the case, we would talk about real state dependence 
as the expenditure itself causes the next period’s higher probability. However, persistence 
could be due to some firms’ characteristics (size, activity, technological opportunities and 
attitude towards risk) that make them keener to have R&D expenditures. If those characteris-
tics are persistent over time, this would induce persistence also in the decision of R&D spend-
ing. In this case, we would talk about spurious state dependence. To correct the problems in-
troduced by the presence of persistence, Wooldridge’s (2005) methodology is applied. 
For the first equation, some results can be highlighted. The probability of participating 
in the CDTI loan system is increased with the firm’s technological profile. Other variables 
affecting this probability positively are sectorial financial constraints (either because of a lack 
of internal and/or external funds or as a consequence of large innovation costs), the presence 
of the firm in foreign markets and its recent experience in other public aid programs, especial-
ly CDTI programs. Sectorial difficulties related to the lack of market information, the exist-
ence of dominant firms and the uncertainty or lack of demand for innovations reduce the pro-
pensity to participate, maybe because these sectors have fewer incentives to conduct and fi-
nance R&D activities. Nevertheless, this result can also be due to the high correlation among 
sectoral indicators of innovation difficulties. Finally, a firm’s size affects the probability of 
being awarded aid positively, although at a decreasing rate, suggesting the existence of entry 
costs when applying for public aid. 
Regarding the decision to invest in R&D, our estimates show a significant and positive 
impact of CDTI loans, suggesting the effectiveness of this aid system. Moreover, if the selec-
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tion problem is not considered, the impact of participation is underestimated; once correcting 
for this bias, the stimulus effect is larger for SMEs than for large firms and also higher for 
manufacturing than for services. 
Finally, our results provide empirical evidence of the persistence in the R&D expendi-
ture decision, reflecting true state dependence. More in detail, firms investing one year have 
around 50% more chances of investing in the next year. The impact of low-interest loans var-
ies from 20 to 30 percentage points depending on the sample analyzed, except for services 
firms, where it is reduced to 9.6 percentage points. This effect is particularly important when 
there is persistence in R&D spending, suggesting that it is possible to induce firms to conduct 
R&D activities permanently by just awarding timely low-interest loans. 
This result points out the relevance of public support to achieve the European Com-
mission's target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D, as far as Spanish business R&D is con-
cerned. Given that Spain belongs to the group of Moderate innovators (European Commis-
sion, 2010), with innovation performance below the EU27, fostering Spanish firms’ techno-
logical activities should require not only an increase in the R&D intensity of actual R&D per-
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APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES  
 
Experience with CDTI funding: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company 
was awarded with other CDTI aid in the recent past. 
 
Experience with other agencies’ funding: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company was awarded with other organizations’ aid in the recent past. 
 
Exporter: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company exported during the peri-
od.  
 
Exports: Exports volume (millions of Euros) during the year (logarithms). 
 
Foreign capital: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company has a share of for-
eign capital of at least 50%. 
 
Group membership: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to a group. 
 
High and medium-tech manufacturing: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sector (NACE2 codes 24, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35). 
 
High-tech services: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to any high-
technology service sector (NACE-2 digits code: 64, 72, 73). 
 
Innovation difficulties: 
 Knowledge: sectorial indicator of the degree of importance given by firms during this 
year to the lack of qualified staff or information on technology as factors making their in-
novation activities difficult. It is computed as the average for each CNAE2 of the values 
assigned by each firm inside this sector during the year (values between 1=not relevant 
and 4=high).  
 Financial: sectorial indicator of the degree of importance given by firms during this year 
to the lack of funds in the firm or group, lack of external financing or high innovation 
costs as factors making their innovation activities difficult. It is computed as the average 
for each CNAE2 of the values assigned by each firm in this sector during the year (values 
between 1=not relevant and 4=high). 
 Market: sectorial indicator of the degree of importance given by firms during this year to 
the lack of market information, the dominance of market by established firms, uncertain 
demand of innovative goods and services or lack of demand of innovations as factors 
making their innovation activities difficult. It is computed as the average for each CNAE2 
of the values assigned by each firm in this sector during the year (values between 1=not 
relevant and 4=high). 
 
Internal R&D expenditures per employee: Total expenditure on internal R&D over total 
employment (logarithms).  
 
Manufacturing: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company belongs to any 
manufacturing sector (NACE2 codes: 10 - 37). 
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Participation: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has been awarded with a 
CDTI soft loan during the year. 
 
Patent application: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm applied for patents 
during the period. 
  
R&D with own resources: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company devoted 
its own resources to invest in R&D during the year. 
 
Services: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to any service sector 
(NACE2 code: 50 - 74). 
 
Size: number of employees during the current year (data in log.). 
 10-49 employees : dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has between 10 
and 49 employees. 
 50-99 employees: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has between 50 and 
99 employees.  
 100-199 employees: dummy variable which the takes value 1 if the firm has between 100 
and 199 employees.  
 200-499 employees: dummy variable which the takes value 1 if the firm has between 200 
and 499 employees.  
 >500 employees: dummy variable which the takes value 1 if the firm has more than 499 
employees.  
 
Start-up: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm was created during the last 
three years.  
 
Technological cooperation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company estab-
lished technological cooperation agreements during the last three years with other partners.  
 
Year of the application: Set of time dummy variables which take the value 1 when the pro-
posal was presented this year. 
 
 
